In 2011, the Spurs traded their backup point guard – George Hill – for the Pacers' draft selection that year – Kawhi Leonard. Both Kawhi and Hill have played well, and both the Pacers and Spurs have made the conference finals the past two seasons. And the narrative has been that both teams benefitted from the trade. However, that's not true; the Spurs fleeced the Pacers. Thankfully, you all agreed on our recent poll on the subject. Of course, hindsight can make things clearer. So let's examine the trade based on the information at the time.

Re-evaluating the Trade

One of the best ways to evaluate the George Hill and Kawhi Leonard trade is to use the research in Stumbling on Wins. Let's start with Kawhi Leonard. Kawhi had the fourth-highest Position Adjusted Win Score (a simplified version of Wins Produced) of all college players in the 2011 draft. No one could know if Kawhi would be a star; however, Stumbling on Wins had a good note on this:

Comparing college PAWS40 to NBA WP48 revealed that more than 80% of the drafted college players who posted a PAWS40 that was one standard deviation below the mean managed to post a career NBA WP48 that was below the mean (this was true whether you looked at players after three or five seasons). If you look at players with a PAWS40 that was one standard deviation above the mean, though, between 60% to 65% went on to post a career WP48 that was above average. These results suggest that identifying poor NBA performers with college data is easier than identifying outstanding NBA performers. Or in other words, if you play poorly in college, it’s likely that you will play poorly in the NBA. Excelling in college, though, is not a guarantee of future success.

Berri, David J.; Schmidt, Martin B. (2009-12-29). Stumbling on Wins (Bonus Content Edition) (Kindle Locations 3008-3014). Pearson Education (US). Kindle Edition. 

Yes, it's hard to predict players. However, for players like Kawhi, the odds were still very good that he'd be an above average player.

Now let's review George Hill. Another key point in Stumbling on Wins is the concept of the age curve. Essentially, players improve in performance until they hit their peak, which is around 25, then they steadily decline. Then they fall off a cliff in their thirties. The good news for the Pacers was that they were getting Hill right at his peak. The bad news? His peak had been mediocre. A reminder, here's how George Hill's Wins Produced per 48 minutes looked at the time:

• 2009 - 0.046
• 2010 - 0.113
• 2011 - 0.124

Also in Stumbling on Wins (seriously, the book has everything! Oh, and we're not even done citing it!) Dave and Martin review coaching. Most coaches aren't found to be statistically significant in regards to improving player performance. However, Gregg Popovich is one of the select few who does (along with Phil Jackson and Flip Saunders). Additionally, players didn't see a significant drop in performance when leaving Popovich. So the Pacers got a well-trained player. However, expecting him to keep improving may have been presumptuous. That brings the final note from Stumbling on Wins. The biggest thing the Pacers could have used to predict George Hill's performance was the previous season:

The primary factor that impacts current performance is what a player did in the previous season. The correlation coefficient, or r, between current and past performance is 0.83. Therefore, past performance explains 69% of the variation in current performance (or the R2 is 0.69). Consistency is still high when one examines players who switch teams. For these players, the correlation coefficient between current and past performance is 0.76 (so R2 is 0.58). 

Berri, David J.; Schmidt, Martin B. (2009-12-29). Stumbling on Wins (Bonus Content Edition) (Kindle Locations 3247-3252). Pearson Education (US). Kindle Edition. 

The Pacers' best bet was that George Hill would be an average player. On the other hand, they had very similar odds that Kawhi would be an above average player (eventually). 

Contracts Matter!

One thing I find that is often left out in people's evaluations of players is their pay. In a league where salaries influence teams' abilities to acquire players, it's important to spend money wisely. Let's examine some Pacers contracts in 2011-2012.

• George Hill - $2.1 Million, year four of a four year rookie contract.
• Kawhi Leonard - $1.7 Million, year one of a four year rookie contract.
• Darren Collison - $1.5 Million, year three of a four year rookie contract.

Alright, so for 2012 season Hill and Kawhi were close in contract values. Except that there was a major difference: rookie contracts are gold. Not only are they absurdly cheap (Kawhi was set to make roughly $8 million over his four years. Keep that number in mind. I'll bring it up shortly), they are also set up under very favorable conditions. The team is obligated to give the player two years guaranteed ($3.5 million in Kawhi's case), followed by two one-year options (for Leonard: $1.9 and $2.9 million, respectively). Finally, the team gets restricted free agency on the player. That means they get to match any offer that the player gets. In short, the team not only has to pay very little, they are allowed to change their mind on the player if things aren't working out. And, they get three chances!

Of course, the Pacers only had one year and one option left on Hill's amazing rookie deal. On the other hand, the Spurs got four years and three options on Leonard's shiny new contract.

Now let's bring up Darren Collison. First, as a point guard, Collison played the same position as George Hill. Next, his performance was not that much different from Hill's. Hill was the better player. Collison's Wins Produced per 48 of 0.105 was below Hill's 0.124, but given the contract and age difference, the Pacers shouldn't have worried. They were basically signing a backup point guard (either Collison to Hill or Hill to Collison), and that seems odd, as their justification for trading Kawhi was because he would be a backup. According to David Morway, Indiana's former GM:

When Kawhi ended up being there, we had to think about taking him. But we already had Danny Granger and Paul George. That’s what made it a little easier for us.

Of course Danny Granger ended up as part of another terrible trade. The Pacers decided indeed that Darren Collison was the backup. At $8 million a season in 2013, George Hill ended up being twice what it would have cost the Pacers to pay Leonard and Collison. And of course, the shipped out Collison for a largely useless Ian Mahinmi.

Improvement!

Hindsight is funny on both sides for the trade. Indeed, George Hill saw a boost in performance. The problem of course is the same hindsight shows that where George Hill became a very good player, that Kawhi Leonard became a star level player. However, the argument goes "Kawhi looks great because he's in the Spurs system!" and indeed there is something to this. As I mentioned, Stumbling on Wins lists Gregg Popovich as a coach that improves his players over multiple seasons. So, for Kawhi's career it's likely best he ended up on the Spurs. However, something interesting happened with the Pacers. From 2011 to 2012, several players saw a large spike in performance. Here's a break down of a few Pacers players that saw a huge jump in performance from 2011 to 2012:

• George Hill 0.124 WP48 -> 0194 WP48
• Paul George 0.126 WP48 -> 0.202 WP48
• Roy Hibbert 0.021 WP48 -> 0.151 WP48

Basically, it's difficult to claim Kawhi benefited from the Spurs and ignore that it seems something happened with the Pacers. Of course, it's hard to know what was the cause for the Pacers leap in performance. Perhaps the lockout helped them out. Also, the Pacers saw a significant decrease in the strength of their opponents. From 2012-2014 they have had the easiest strength of schedule in the league. Their defense has also been very impressive the last two seasons. And indeed, at one point this season they were playing out of their minds. In short, it's hard to know if Kawhi wouldn't have benefited from a boost in Indiana as well. And using the same hindsight (which, again, still doesn't make the trade look fair), he would certainly have worked out better than Granger.

I want to stress, there were lots of unknowns in the trade. Would Kawhi have been an effective player? Would George Hill play well in Indiana? But using what we did know:

• Kawhi was a significantly better than average college player
• George Hill was an average 25 year old NBA player
• Darren Collison was an average 24 year old NBA player

Add in evaluating the player contracts, the simple fact is that this was not a good trade on Indiana's part. Was it a terrible trade? Well, in the sense that Indiana turned a first round pick into an average player, which rarely happens, no. In the sense that they spent their money terribly given the knowledge they had? Yes, it was a terrible trade. Devin gave the trade a C+ when it happened. I told him recently that I thought that was high. I'll confess, my F grade for the same trade was off. I fell for the same hindsight mistake many use to justify George Hill as a good addition. But when we go back and examine the contract situations, the data, and the player performances at the time, the Pacers lost this deal badly. And the worst part? They think the made a fair trade. Given that Larry Bird's track record was already poor, and has stayed low since, I wouldn't expect the Pacers to stay at the top of the East. That being said, it's hard to predict the future, and we never know if a team might stumble on unexpected wins.